so on. I'll use 'rational behavior' and 'rational action' interchangeably, since they differ trivially in meaning, if at all. I won't discuss the phrase 'rational choice', though it often means the same thing. 2 In this section I'll describe the three main ways philosophers use 'rational behavior'. 3 For now I wish to remain neutral on whether these uses reflect mere semantic variation or genuine disagreement about rationality. That is an issue for section three.
However, biased language might creep in. For example, I might refer to an 'account' of rational behavior, which suggests that it competes against other accounts. In this section, ignore such insinuations, which are irrelevant to its taxonomic purpose.
Rational Behavior as Ethical Behavior
'Rational' is closely linked in etymology and everyday use to 'reason'. Indeed, 'rational behavior' is sometimes used interchangeably with 'reasonable behavior'. 4 Hence, rational behavior is sometimes thought of as behavior best backed by reasons. 5 Typically those reasons are thought of as subjective, as propositions the agent ought to regard as providing practical reasons, on her evidence. Thus I may rationally opt for surgery if my evidence suggests I have a malignant tumor, even if I really don't.
On this use of 'rational', the rational action is 'the best thing to do' or 'what it makes sense to do' or 'what one ought to do', as Gibbard tells us. 6 These phrases can also describe ethical behavior. Thus, rational behavior is sometimes identified with ethical behavior. 7 This use of 'rational' is uncommon in economics, 8 but philosophers such as Sidgwick, Smart, Brandt, Frankena, Hare, Gauthier, Gibbard, Quinn, Sumner, and Scanlon have used 'rational' along these lines, sometimes tailoring it to their own ethical views.
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Rational Behavior as Self-Interested Behavior
The word 'rational', Hare says, 'is sometimes used more or less synonymously with "prudent". . .' 10 To act rationally, in this sense, is to act in one's self-interest. Or rather, it's to act in what seems like one's self-interest, given one's evidence. This use of 'rational' has deep roots. Sidgwick cites over a dozen historical figures who, like him, sympathize with identifying rational and self-interested behavior. 11 There is 'preponderant assent', Sidgwick says, to this view in 'the common sense of mankind'
and in 'the history of ethical thought in England'. 12 And according to Parfit: 'It has been assumed, for more than two millennia, that it is irrational for anyone to do what he knows will be worse for himself'. 13 'Rational' is also closely associated with selfinterest among economists and social theorists. According to Sen, 'the self-interest interpretation of rationality . . . has been one of the central features of mainline economic theorizing for several centuries'. 14 And '[t]he concept of rationality familiar in social theory', Gauthier says, 'identifies rationality with the maximization of individual utility'. 15 
Instrumental Rationality
Instrumentalism is roughly the idea that I act rationality just in case I intelligently pursue my ends, whatever they happen to be. 16 The instrumentalist intuition is the basis of decision theory, which, according to Pettit and Smith, has been the orthodox account of rationality for the last two hundred years. 17 The decision theory literature is vast, but I'll lay out its central thrust about the nature of rational behavior.
I act with instrumental rationality just in case I maximize expected utility, under a specific interpretation. In general, to calculate the expected utility of an action, multiply the value of each possible outcome by that outcome's probability, and sum the products.
The maximizing act (if there is just one) is the possible act with the highest expected utility. So, to determine the instrumentally rational act, one must determine: (i) the possible acts; (ii) the possible outcomes of those acts; (iii) the probabilities of those outcomes obtaining; and (iv) the outcomes' values. How do instrumentalists do this?
They say little about (i); there is no distinctively instrumentalist way to identify possible acts. 18 (ii)-(iv), however, merit discussion. I'll take them up in reverse order.
(iv) Instrumentalists measure value or utility in terms of the agent's preference- Next, consider the ethical and instrumentalist uses. Instrumentalists hold that rational action maximizes the expected satisfaction of one's coherent preferences. But the coherence requirement for preferences rules out little in terms of content. Coherence is understood, not robustly, but merely as analogous to consistency -intransitive preferences, for example, are likened to inconsistent beliefs. 23 For this reason, many coherent preferences are blatantly unethical, and much instrumentally rational behavior is manifestly deplorable. 24 Thus, the ethical and instrumentalist uses are distinct.
Finally, compare the self-interested and instrumentalist uses of 'rational behavior'. Promoting one's interests and satisfying one's desires do seem closely related.
Are the instrumentalist and prudential uses really the same, in some important way? They are not. First, using 'rational' to refer to self-interested behavior does not entail using it to refer to behavior that satisfies one's desires. The desire theory of self-interest faces strong criticism, 25 and there are well-known alternatives to it. 26 The literature often suggests that the instrumentalist use of 'rational' is equivalent to one of the others, even though it isn't. Instead of saying that rational action maximizes the agent's expected preference-satisfaction, instrumentalists often just say that it maximizes expected utility -thus seeming to identify rational action with ethical action from a utilitarian standpoint. And instrumentalists often just say that the rational action maximizes individual utility -thus seeming to identify rational behavior with selfinterested behavior. Gauthier admits making this second slip. 29 And Rawls slides between instrumentalist and self-interested uses in A Theory of Justice. On one page, he says, 'I have assumed throughout that the persons in the original position are rational. In choosing between principles each tries as best he can to advance his interests'. 30 This suggests rationality as self-interest. But on the next page Rawls gives 'rational' an instrumentalist interpretation: 'Thus in the usual way, a rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the options open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, and which has the greater chance of being successfully executed'. 31 There is no suggestion here that the agent's purposes and desires can't be altruistic and self-denying.
THE THREE USES DO NOT REFLECT RIVAL THEORIES OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
How are the three uses of 'rational action' related? On the leading view, they reflect
substantive disagreement about what rational behavior is; they express rival theories of rational action. 32 However, it is not clear what this disagreement is supposed to be about.
I'll consider three attempts to pinpoint the alleged dispute, all inadequate. Thus, three suggestions have failed to identify the alleged dispute; they either create an equally hard and similar problem, or they entail that the 'dispute' has such a clear winner that no large group of philosophers would ever have disagreed. In criticizing these proposals, I did not nitpick; I did not assume they should offer precise analytic conditions for rational action and then offer clever and contrived counterexamples.
Rather, I showed that they do not illuminate an underlying dispute even dimly. And I know of no proposal better than these.
Moreover, appealing to paradigm cases won't help show the existence of a disagreement. Imagine some exemplars of rational behavior. One might think the dispute is over what unites them as rational: are they rational because of their relation to selfinterest, to ethics, or to desire-satisfaction? But merely gesturing at examples doesn't show that some privileged set of features unites them as rational; each may be rational in three different senses. 36 Also, for what it's worth, my intuitions suggest that there is no substantive issue.
Consider, for example, an act that will harm me but is ethically right and will maximize my expected preference-satisfaction. Suppose I willingly make some large sacrifice for my child. Is my act rational? One might say: 'The act is rational on the ethical and instrumentalist understandings of 'rational', is not rational on the self-interested understanding, 37 and that is the end of it'. Intuitively, this seems right to me; I don't sense a further issue about whether the action is 'really' rational.
I can't prove that no dispute divides instrumentalists, rational egoists and rational ethicists. Perhaps there is an explanation of the dispute that no one has offered. Or perhaps the disagreement resists explanation; the disagreement is about what makes behavior rational, but this notion of rationality cannot be characterized in any illuminating way. I can't rule out these possibilities, but I know of no reason to believe them. And Ockham's razor counsels denying that there is a genuine dispute, if we lack any justification for believing in one.
I conclude that no legitimate controversy underlies the three different uses of 'rational'. The ethical, self-interested, and instrumentalist uses reflect mere semantic difference, not substantive disagreement.
Of course, we can have substantive disagreements about whether an act is rational, if we both understand 'rational' in the same way. In such a case, we're not really arguing about rationality; we're arguing about ethics, or prudence, or coherence. Debates within one of the three major uses may also concern which analysis or precisification most deserves the commendatory force of 'rational'.
We can even have substantive disagreements when our understandings differ.
Consider, for example, whether it is rational to co-operate in the prisoner's dilemma. Is Second, even if we can characterize the subject matter of ethics no better than by saying 'it's about how one ought to live, all things considered', this is less problematic than characterizing the subject matter of practical rationality by saying 'it's about how one ought (rationally) to live, all things considered'. Here is why. Both the ethical 'ought' and the rational 'ought' are normative terms. But while normative realists must grant the legitimacy of the ethical debates, they needn't grant the legitimacy of rationality debates.
Normative realists must accept ethics as legitimate because the ethical 'ought' has so little content, aside from pure normative content, applied to action. But the rational 'ought' must have more content than that, since it is not the same concept as the ethical 'ought'. Thus, while a defense of the ethical debates must merely defend the normative, a defense of the rationality debates must also supply this extra content. And, as I have The interpretations share two important semantic elements. First, they emphasize using reason to achieve goals (be those goals ethical, self-interested, or simply the agent's). If one acts rationally, it always involves intelligently using what one knows, or using the evidence at one's disposal. Second, 'rational' is typically a term of praise. 40 Rational action is commended for its relation to good cognition, and perhaps also for the value of its ends (be they ethical, self-interested, or simply the agent's). So, the different meanings of 'rational behavior' can be thought of as species under a genus. The generic meaning is that 'rational' describes behavior that could result from good reasoning. The species differ as to what the reasoning is about -whether self-interest, the agent's goals, or what it would be best to do. 41 Given how much 'rational' is used, this analysis is bound to be imperfect.
Sometimes philosophers (and often economists) seem to use 'rational behavior' to refer to self-interested behavior without intending to praise it. And sometimes the cognitive element of rational action seems to disappear behind the goal of the behavior. The important point for us is that when philosophers apply 'rational' to different practical domains, they are not thereby disagreeing.
Gibbard's objection
Gibbard argues that 'rational' can't mean 'instrumentally effective'. And since instrumentalists aren't defining 'rational', they must be offering a theory of rationality.
Gibbard's argument thus threatens my claim that instrumentalism, rational egoism, and the ethical interpretation aren't competing theories.
In his argument, Gibbard says that this belief is coherent:
(B): I am rationally required to give weight to my future happiness, even if doing so wouldn't achieve my goals (because I am indifferent to the future). 42 And so, he concludes, 'rational' can't mean 'instrumentally effective'. And therefore, instrumentalism is a substantive theory.
This argument, however, is fallacious. At most it shows that 'rational' can't have just an instrumental meaning, since it has no such meaning in (B). 43 And I agree that 'rational' doesn't just have an instrumental meaning, since there are at least two other semantic interpretations of 'rational action' (namely, the ethical and prudential interpretations). In (B), 'rational' (or rather, 'rationally required') is best interpreted prudentially (though it may also be interpreted ethically). Even if I don't care about my future happiness, not giving it weight is imprudent (and violates the ethical principle of giving weight to everyone's future interests). So, Gibbard cannot conclude that 'rational' has no instrumentalist meaning. And thus he hasn't shown that instrumentalism is a substantive theory.
CHANGING OUR USE OF 'RATIONAL BEHAVIOR'
Using 'rational' in three different ways -ethical, prudential and instrumentalistencourages the false belief that there are three rival theories of rational behavior. Also, making 'rational' do so much work can obscure its meaning on particular occasions, since many acts are rational in more than one way. For example, exercising might be rational in terms of self-interest, ethics, and the agent's own desires, so calling exercise 'rational' is less informative than one might think. On balance, we should change our use of 'rational', despite what the different uses have in common.
Should we continue calling self-interested behavior 'rational'? I don't see why;
neither clarity nor economy would be lost in just talking about 'self-interested' or 'prudent' behavior. Moreover, calling only self-interested behavior 'rational' suggests that ethical egoism is true: that self-interested reasons are, ultimately, our only practical reasons. 44 The insinuation is dangerous. Studies suggest that economists are especially egoistic, perhaps because they habitually associate 'rational' with self-interest.
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I also think we shouldn't use 'rational' ethically, though I see why people do.
Ethical behavior is the behavior best supported by reasons. And the normative force of 'rational' is appropriately aimed at right action. However, it will usually be clearer to talk about what is ethical or what is best (given what the agent knows) rather than what is rational. If one wants to emphasize the relationship between ethics and reasons, it might be better to talk about 'reasonable behavior' than 'rational behavior'. 'Reasonable' is the less corrupted term.
We shouldn't try to eliminate the instrumentalist use of 'rational', for several reasons. First, using 'rational' to refer to the instrumentalist idea is economical because that idea is so complicated. Second, the instrumentalist use is deeply embedded in the decision theory literature; it could not easily be abandoned. Third, it is natural to connect the rationality of behavior to that of belief and desire. The instrumentalist tradition lets us explore these connections, if we find them worthwhile. Fourth and finally, the normative connotations of 'rational' are not wholly out of place in the literature of decision theory.
For instrumentalists, rationality involves norms such as consistency of choice, coherence of desire, adherence to evidence, and intelligibility of action.
So, the instrumentalist use should stay, and the others should go. It's not that rational action is 'really' what the instrumentalists say it is; it's just that their use of 'rational' is more useful and entrenched than the others.
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